GR 133495
September 3, 1998
MENDOZA, J
Petitioner: Benjamin U. Borja, Jr.
Respondents: COMELEC, Jose T. Capco, Jr.
Facts: Capco, Jr was elected vice-mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor. On March 27, 1998, Petitioner sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and is therefore ineligible to serve for another term.
Issue: Did Capco serve his three-terms?
Held: No. Capco is still eligible for his second re-election as he has not served his third term. The Constitution should be understood bearing in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption and the evils if any sought to be prevented or remedied. Article X of the Constitution does not only seek to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to preserve the freedom of choice of the people that is why the Constitutional Commission rejected a proposal to perpetually disqualify local and legislative officials from running for the same position after their three-term limit.
Jun 18, 2015
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary
GR 83896
February 22, 1991
FERNAN, C.J
Facts: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284 issued by President Aquino which allows a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations. This EO provision allegedly contravenes the provision of Sec 1, Article VII prohibiting the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants to hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
Issue: Is EO 284 is unconstitutional?
Held: Yes for being in direct contrast of the mandate of Sec 1, Article VII. The Court in construing a constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption and the evils if any sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstance under which the Constitution was formed. What is being prevented by this provision is the abuses made by unscrupulous officials holding concurrent positions who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment as what became prevalent during the time of President Marcos.
February 22, 1991
FERNAN, C.J
Facts: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284 issued by President Aquino which allows a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations. This EO provision allegedly contravenes the provision of Sec 1, Article VII prohibiting the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants to hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
Issue: Is EO 284 is unconstitutional?
Held: Yes for being in direct contrast of the mandate of Sec 1, Article VII. The Court in construing a constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption and the evils if any sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstance under which the Constitution was formed. What is being prevented by this provision is the abuses made by unscrupulous officials holding concurrent positions who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment as what became prevalent during the time of President Marcos.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
GR 160261
November 10, 2003
Petitioners: It's a compiled case so there are a LOT!
Facts: The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which defined ‘initiated’ as to be counted against the one-year time bar rule, only on the day that the Committee on Justice finds the case against the official as sufficient in substance. On 2 June 2003, President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide but was found to be insufficient in substance. The following day, the second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Davide., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the lower House.
Issue: Is the second impeachment barred by the one-year time bar rule?
Held: Yes. The second impeachment complaint filed against the Chief Justice is barred. Article 11, Sec 3, par. 5 explicitly ordains that ‘no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year’. Whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning, verba legis. Initiate must be understood in its ordinary, plain meaning, which means, to begin, to commence, to set going. Hence an impeachment is initiated upon the filing of a complaint. When there is ambiguity, ratio legis et anima, meaning the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers which is to prevent too frequent harassment against the impeachable officer, and to allow the legislature to do its principal task, legislation.
November 10, 2003
Petitioners: It's a compiled case so there are a LOT!
Facts: The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which defined ‘initiated’ as to be counted against the one-year time bar rule, only on the day that the Committee on Justice finds the case against the official as sufficient in substance. On 2 June 2003, President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide but was found to be insufficient in substance. The following day, the second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Davide., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the lower House.
Issue: Is the second impeachment barred by the one-year time bar rule?
Held: Yes. The second impeachment complaint filed against the Chief Justice is barred. Article 11, Sec 3, par. 5 explicitly ordains that ‘no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year’. Whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning, verba legis. Initiate must be understood in its ordinary, plain meaning, which means, to begin, to commence, to set going. Hence an impeachment is initiated upon the filing of a complaint. When there is ambiguity, ratio legis et anima, meaning the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers which is to prevent too frequent harassment against the impeachable officer, and to allow the legislature to do its principal task, legislation.
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Union BFAR vs COA
GR 169815,
August 13, 2008
Facts: The BFAR Employees Union issued a resolution requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified its request on the high cost of living which makes it hard to sustain even the four basic needs. On post-audit, COA disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance for being unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Issue: Is the disallowance in question unconstitutional?
Held: The court denied the petition. Social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles and policies giving guidelines for legislation and that they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
August 13, 2008
Facts: The BFAR Employees Union issued a resolution requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified its request on the high cost of living which makes it hard to sustain even the four basic needs. On post-audit, COA disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance for being unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Issue: Is the disallowance in question unconstitutional?
Held: The court denied the petition. Social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles and policies giving guidelines for legislation and that they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
GR 122156
February 3, 1997
Facts: The respondent decided to sell through a public bidding 30% to 51% of outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation which owns Manila Hotel. In a close bidding, Renong Berhad (a Malaysian company), won by a margin of P33, 000,000 versus the petitioner, Manila Prince Hotel. Before the declaration of the winning bidder, the petitioner sought to match the offer of Renong Berhad by sending a manager’s check for P33,000,000, which GSIS refused to accept. The petitioner invokes Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article XII which states that ‘in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
Issue: Is Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing?
Held: Yes. Some provisions of the Constitution are merely declarations of policies and principles. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. It is so if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. All provisions of the constitution are presumed as self-executing if it is not expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce its mandate.
February 3, 1997
Facts: The respondent decided to sell through a public bidding 30% to 51% of outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation which owns Manila Hotel. In a close bidding, Renong Berhad (a Malaysian company), won by a margin of P33, 000,000 versus the petitioner, Manila Prince Hotel. Before the declaration of the winning bidder, the petitioner sought to match the offer of Renong Berhad by sending a manager’s check for P33,000,000, which GSIS refused to accept. The petitioner invokes Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article XII which states that ‘in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
Issue: Is Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing?
Held: Yes. Some provisions of the Constitution are merely declarations of policies and principles. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. It is so if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. All provisions of the constitution are presumed as self-executing if it is not expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce its mandate.
People v Perfecto
GR L-18463
October 4, 1922
Petitioner: State
Respondent: Gregorio Perfecto, editor of La Nacion
Facts: The respondent had written an editorial against the Philippine Senate and its members in connection with the disappearance of certain documents. He was prosecuted under Art 256 of the Spanish Penal Code which states that ‘any person who, by writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown, or other person in authority”.
Issue: Is Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code still in force?
Held: Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is now not in force because it was abrogated when Spain ceded the Philippines to American sovereignty. It is a general principle of public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated, wherein the term ‘political’ refers to the laws being used to regulate relations of the sovereign with the inhabitants of its territory.
October 4, 1922
Petitioner: State
Respondent: Gregorio Perfecto, editor of La Nacion
Facts: The respondent had written an editorial against the Philippine Senate and its members in connection with the disappearance of certain documents. He was prosecuted under Art 256 of the Spanish Penal Code which states that ‘any person who, by writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown, or other person in authority”.
Issue: Is Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code still in force?
Held: Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is now not in force because it was abrogated when Spain ceded the Philippines to American sovereignty. It is a general principle of public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated, wherein the term ‘political’ refers to the laws being used to regulate relations of the sovereign with the inhabitants of its territory.
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